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I. Introduction
{1} How valuable is $100? To a student? To a single unemployed parent? To a well-compensated professional?
The Federal Reserve Board apparently believes that the potential loss of $100 is not a tremendous burden on
anyone. In a recently proposed rule,[1] the Board exempts stored value cards[2] that contain less than $100 from
the same regulations that protect consumers from most types of fraud associated with ATM, debit, and credit
cards. Regulation E (Reg E) currently regulates the electronic funds transfers (EFTs) that are at the heart of
ATM/debit/credit card transactions by requiring printed receipts, error resolution procedures, periodic
statements, initial disclosure of terms of usage, and more.[3] Without these protections, stored value card holders
will be easy targets for unscrupulous vendors who shave off an extra few pennies per transaction as well as
fraudulent issuers who disburse defective cards. In short, the $100 de minimis exemption of stored value cards
from Reg E protection is an open invitation to fraud.
{2} The Board buried this de minimis exemption in a detailed proposed amendment to Reg E that purports to
impose modified consumer protection regulations on the rapidly expanding stored value card industry. However,
the de minimis exemption swallows the larger rule in which it is embedded. Large financial organizations such
as Visa, Citibank, and MasterCard are primarily interested in stored value cards as a means to tap into a lucrative
market of low value transactions. For transactions valued at less than $20 that is estimated at $750 billion
http://jolt.richmond.edu/jolt-archive/v5i2/oconnor.html
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annually in the United States alone,[4] and for transactions valued at less than $10 it is an estimated $2 trillion
annually worldwide.[5] Thus, there is little desire to issue high value stored value cards that would trigger
regulation anyway. In fact, industry experts already talk about "the typical $100 value limit on a stored-value
card."[6] Further, the low entry costs to this enormous market, coupled with the ease of avoiding regulation
afforded by the de minimis exemption, will attract a host of large and small investors, some of whom may
capitalize on the substantial fraud potential of an unregulated and poorly understood new technology. Hints of
things to come may be seen in the current proliferation and abuse of stored value cards, such as prepaid
telephone calling cards.[7]
{3} While the Federal Reserve Board's stated rationale for the amendment and exemption is to balance
consumer and industry interests,[8] the structure and amount of the de minimis exemption clearly favors card
issuers.[9] Industry representatives claim that imposition of Reg E provisions, such as required transaction
receipts, will make further development of the market economically unfeasible: "Premature regulation could
'impede the growth' and 'conceivably stop development' of new technologies."[10] But this is not an argument
for complete exemption, rather it suggests truly modified regulations. A variation of this argument posits that
legislation will "hinder competitive advantages and innovation in the industry."[11] One commentator says,
"Regulations may stunt innovation because card companies would have to fit their product into a pigeon hole."
[12]
{4} At the same time, the industry asserts the usual "market forces" argument that is always trotted out when
consumer protecting regulations are threatened. In this case, market forces will weed out unscrupulous vendors,
while word of mouth and media coverage will quickly educate consumers as to the potential dangers of these
cards.[13] As Congressman Michael N. Castle argues, "[I]t would seem premature for regulations to pick
winners and losers before the market is allowed to test . . . contrasting features. . . . I believe that the market will
produce bargains, however Faustian, that a significant segment of consumers will choose to accept."[14] But
these arguments often prove too much. Why regulate food products or drugs either, if consumers will simply
boycott merchants who sell tainted products? The answer in both cases points to the level of potential harm
combined with serious informational disadvantages on the part of consumers. Consumer advocates are
concerned that the stored value card industry will disproportionately target and exploit lower-income groups
who "do not have the resources to investigate alternatives," in the same way that many consumer loan companies
and check cashing shops currently do.[15]
{5} More telling, however, is that the enabling legislation for Reg E--the Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 1978
(EFTA)[16]--is solely and expressly intended as consumer protection. The Board's balancing concern is selfimposed through its own internal Regulatory Planning and Review program.[17] Thus, the Board should instead
be first and foremost concerned with protecting consumers, including those for whom $100 is a substantial
amount of money. This paper proposes an alternative Reg E amendment that offers better protection for
consumers while not imposing unduly harsh restrictions on a nascent, potentially useful industry. Part I describes
important existing Reg E provisions in greater detail. Part II outlines the relevant aspects of stored value cards.
Part III critically analyzes the de minimis exemption buried in the proposed Reg E amendment in light of the
potential for fraud, while Part IV suggests a better compromise.

II. Regulation E
{6} Regulation E is the implementing code for the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) of 1978.[18] EFTA was
passed in response to concerns that new EFT technologies opened the door for high tech criminals ("hackers,"
"crackers," and "phreaks") to intercept or initiate transactions with the nightmarish possibility of wiping out
someone's entire bank account with a keystroke. Thus, EFTA and Reg E provide the framework for rights,
responsibilities, and liabilities of parties to EFT transactions.[19] Further, the stated primary objective of the act
and regulation is to protect individual consumers who participate in EFTs.[20] Congress delegated rulewriting
authority to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System when it passed the Act.[21] Under the
Board's current interpretation, as embodied in Reg E, EFTA covers transactions involving point-of-sale (POS)
systems, automated teller machines (ATMs), direct deposits or withdrawals of funds, telephone bill-payment
http://jolt.richmond.edu/jolt-archive/v5i2/oconnor.html
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plans, and transfers involving debit cards, even where not initiated through an electronic terminal.[22] However,
this is not intended to be an exhaustive list.[23] The following are the important consumer protections of Reg E.

A. Restrictions on Unsolicited Issuance of Access Cards
{7} Unsolicited access cards may be sent, but they must be invalid, clearly marked as such, and validated only
upon the consumer's oral or written request.[24] This helps prevent EFT access to individual's accounts from
falling into the wrong hands, particularly where the account holder is not even aware that an access card exists.

B. Limits on Consumer Liability for Unauthorized Transactions
{8} Generally, consumers' liability is limited to $50 for unauthorized use of an access device as long as they
notify the issuer within two days of learning of its loss or theft.[25] This provision is controversial because it can
be viewed as a close policy decision regarding placing a burden on parties that have no attributable fault. By
placing the burden upon the card issuer, however, Reg E gives a strong incentive for that issuer to incorporate
reasonable security measures such as access codes into the system.

C. Initial Disclosure of Terms and Conditions of EFT Service
{9} Before the first EFT occurs, issuers must disclose the following:[26]
1. liability
2. issuer's address, telephone number, and business hours
3. types and limitations of EFTs
4. fees
5. subsequent documentation
6. stop payment procedures
7. confidentiality, and
8. error resolution procedures.
{10} In the absence of this provision, card issuers could incorporate hidden fees, liabilities, and unexpected card
functions that the user would not discover until at least after the first card usage.

D. Change in Terms Notice
{11} In particular, changes resulting in increased consumer fees or liability, fewer available types of EFTs, or
stricter limits on the frequency or dollar amount of EFTs, trigger the requirement of written notice to the
consumer 21 days before the effective date.[27] Additionally, error resolution procedure notices must go out at
least annually, even where no change has been made.[28] Similar to the initial disclosure requirement, this
provision reduces card issuers' ability to impose hidden or surprise fees, liabilities, or functions without notice.

E. Issuance of Terminal Receipts and Periodic Account Statements
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{12} Receipts must be made available at the time of transaction recording the amount, date, type, identification
of account accessed, terminal location, and any third parties involved.[29] Periodic statements must be issued
monthly where there is at least one transaction per month, quarterly if less, and contain the same information
about each transaction as required for receipts.[30] Statements must also show account fees, balances, contact
information for inquiries, and telephone number for preauthorized transfers.[31] This provision is the
cornerstone of Reg E protection. It virtually eliminates the possibility of "black box" transactions where the user
has no idea whether $10 or $100 has just been transferred.

F. Rights Regarding Preauthorized EFTs
{13} Preauthorized EFTs can only be established through the written request of the user; and, financial
institutions must update users regarding transfer status within two business days, unless the payor has taken this
responsibility.[32] Users may stop preauthorized transfers by written or oral notice at least three days before
scheduled transfer; the financial institution may request that written confirmation of an oral request be submitted
within fourteen days.[33] Users must receive notice of preauthorized EFTs that vary in amount, except where he
or she authorizes a payment range and the variance is within that range.[34] Credit cannot be predicated on the
user's acceptance of preauthorized EFT payments.[35] One can envision a variety of problematic scenarios
involving preauthorized EFTs run amuck in the absence of regulation.

G. Error Resolution Procedures
{14} "Errors" include EFTs that are unauthorized, incorrect, omitted from periodic statements, subject to
computational or bookkeeping mistakes, not reported in accordance with Reg E, or disbursed to the wrong
amount.[36] Consumers have sixty days from the mailing of a periodic statement or account documentation to
notify the financial institution of a possible error; the institution may require written confirmation of notice.[37]
Financial institutions have ten days to investigate error allegations.[38] Then, they must report results to the
consumer within three days after that.[39] And finally, the financial institution must correct the error within one
business day if one has occurred where one is determined to have occurred.[40] Where the institution cannot
complete its inquiry within ten days, it must provisionally credit the consumer's account, including interest
where applicable, and notify the consumer of this action. The institution then has forty-five days to determine
whether an error occurred, with the other deadlines remaining the same.[41] Extensions of twenty days instead
of ten, and ninety instead of forty-five are permissible where the EFT was initiated out-of-state or through a POS
debit transaction.[42] Where no error is determined to exist, or the error is not on the part of the financial
institution, a written explanation must be issued, setting out how this was determined and what documents were
used. These documents must be made available to consumer, and any debit of provisional credits must be
reported to the consumer.[43] This provision takes on importance when one considers how hard it could be for
the consumer to track down a suspected error by herself. Further, without this provision an error could result in
the freezing of some or all of a consumer's assets.

III. Stored Value Cards
{15}"Stored value card" is really a functional description for a few different technologies where the card is a
proxy for the exchange of hard currency for services or goods. It is different from checks, credit cards, and most
other forms of proxy payments in that the value is transferred at the time of the transaction. Thus, it is more
closely related to "check cards" or debit cards that deduct money from the user's account at the time of a
transaction. The main difference between stored value cards and debit cards is commonly held to be that the
former contain the value on the card itself, while the latter only point to the proper remote account for immediate
value deduction. We will see that this is not always the case. Some stored value systems such as prepaid
telephone cards rely on remote accounts that serve as short term, single purpose bank accounts.
http://jolt.richmond.edu/jolt-archive/v5i2/oconnor.html
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{16}The main problem with stored value cards that make them a perfect target for fraud is that the user can
neither directly "see" what is on the card nor what transactions have modified its contents. In a cash transaction,
the consumer can count her change and dispute the transaction on the spot if necessary with physical proof . In
an stored value card transaction, the consumer must rely upon either her own reader and display, or one provided
by the other party, to verify what has been done to the data on the card. If there is no reader available, the
consumer has no idea whether the correct amount was deducted--it is a "black box" transaction. Currently, the
two main technologies utilized are magnetic stripe and integrated circuit cards.

A. Magnetic Stripe Cards
{17} Based on the same recording technology as floppy disks and audio tapes, magnetic stripe (mag stripe)
cards retain up to one kilobit of data.[44] They are characterized by the black stripe--magnetic material
combined with paint or binder--stamped or laminated onto one side which can be "swiped" through an electronic
reader. Basically, this strip of material contains tiny magnetic particles that can be reoriented independently of
each other. When the strip is passed over an electro-magnetic device (write head) the particles are polarized into
patterns. When it is subsequently passed over a similar electromagnetic device (read head), the pattern is
translated back into an electronic signal.
{18} Unfortunately, this system requires that the strip be exposed for access, resulting in vulnerability to
physical damage and improper access. Further, the magnetic particles are susceptible to distortion from nearby
magnetic fields, and can only be "rewritten" a limited number of times. On the other hand, a benefit is that the
mechanism is cheap and has already been implemented in the extensive network of ATM and POS terminals
across the globe. Thus, new mag stripe applications can be rapidly assimilated into a global network.

B. Chip Cards
{19} Advances in semiconductor technology have resulted in computer chips small enough to be embedded into
credit card sized plastic housings, known as integrated circuits (ICs). [45] These chips are essentially electronic
circuits--transistors and all--condensed onto one small piece of semiconductor material.[46] Three types of
combined ICs power three types of cards: memory cards, challenge/response cards, and microprocessor cards.
{20} Memory chips allow data to be stored and retrieved so that cards containing them can have value loaded
and deducted by anyone with the proper reader.[47] But, if the card is misplaced or stolen, anyone can use it.
Likewise, a party contemplating accepting the card must have some means to determine whether the value stored
is "genuine." We will consider these issues further in the section, "Logistics and Economics of Stored Value
Cards" below.[48]
{21} Because memory chips offer no security for data, they are often installed with a "gatekeeper" logic chip
that administers a "challenge/response" authentication feature that requires a personal identification number (
PIN) to access the card's data.[49] Challenge/response cards can be configured both to protect the card's value in
the event of loss or theft and to prevent an unscrupulous bearer from "reloading" value without actually paying
for it.
{22} The addition of a microprocessor chip to make a "smart card" enables sophisticated authentication features,
file systems, and actual data processing. Existing smart cards generally employ an 8 bit processor running at 10
MHz.[50] As full-fledged processors, they can, theoretically, perform all the computing functions of a PC.
Although, practically, minimal memory and lack of interface or peripherals precludes such extensive
applications. Yet a card that can perform its own complex data processing, account calculations and
sophisticated identification verification[51] is attractive to a wide consortium of commercial and government
organizations.[52] The inclusion of a stored value function is a low cost and profitable value-added feature.
http://jolt.richmond.edu/jolt-archive/v5i2/oconnor.html
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C. Logistics and Economics of Stored Value Cards
{23} The various technologies employed for stored value cards result in different operational and economic
consequences. An important conceptual distinction is "closed" vs. "open" systems. Closed systems are
exemplified by many subway systems: riders deposit cash in the system's ticket dispensing machines which, in
turn, produce tickets that can only be used in that system. Open systems are exemplified by some university
systems: students purchase cards that can be used in transactions with unrelated vendors on, and sometimes off,
campus.
{24} Closed systems present fewer challenges to potential card issuers and redeemers because there are no third
parties involved. Since the same organization issues and redeems the card, there is little incentive for fraudulent
misrepresentation of transactions between the issuing entity and the redeeming entity. Further, closed system
operators can better monitor their cards for consumer fraud through direct control and familiarity. Thus, closed
systems can be adequately managed with mag stripe cards, and the cost of entering a market with this type of
system is relatively low. Perhaps because of all this, closed systems have already been deployed while open
systems are still in testing.
{25} Presently, closed mag stripe card programs are used in the subway systems of San Francisco and
Washington, D.C. They are also employed as prepaid phone cards.[53] The success of these programs, combined
with all the recent attention given to electronic commerce, has led financial institutions and other organizations
to investigate open stored value systems.[54] Chip cards can replace cash with "electronic" or "digital" cash that
can be used with third party vendors who choose to accept it. The hook for issuers is the incredible amount of
"float" possible from the aggregate of millions of cards, each loaded with value that may not be redeemed for a
month or more.[55] Further, it targets the enormous, untapped small cash transaction market (less than $20) that
is estimated at $750 billion to $2 trillion annually.[56]
{26} Mag stripe cards will probably not be used for open systems because the small value exchanged in the
targeted transactions could be swamped by the necessary online verification costs. Also, a substantial portion of
the market potential exists in places inhospitable to telecommunications links. Thus, financial institutions such
as Visa are turning to chip cards because of their greater versatility and security.[57] It is also notable that the
financial institutions are testing full microprocessor cards--"smart cards"--that will contain all of the bearer's
financial records. Visa has dubbed these "relationship cards."[58] Ultimately, stored value will be only one of
many applications housed on the card; others might be credit/debit, mortgages, and loans.[59]
{27} Non-banking organizations are also poised to enter the small transaction stored value card market, similar
to the rush to provide prepaid phone cards.[60] There is already significant fraud, however, perpetrated in two
directions: against issuers and against consumers. Three types of fraud against issuers are counterfeiting,
skimming, and buffering.[61] While there are some ways to counter these frauds, they can be costly and
imperfect.[62] On the other hand, many of the closed systems appear to be relatively successful, despite these
problems.
{28} Fraud against consumers is the main focus of this paper, though, and the rapid proliferation of prepaid
phone cards is instructive as to the type and magnitude of consumer fraud that unregulated stored value systems
are vulnerable to. Rising from use by only 1% of U.S. households in 1995 to 10% in 1996, phone cards are now
a $1 billion annual business.[63] But at the same time, many card issuers have failed and left consumers with
worthless cards.[64] Further, because there are no regulations such as disclosure requirements, many cards have
hidden fees and surcharges, while others expire after a fixed period whether the calling time has been used or
not, and some simply never work.[65] Perhaps more concerning, though, the prepaid phone card business has
become attractive enough that even the Mafia is reported by the New York Times to be moving quickly into it as
a means to make up for the curtailment of some of its core businesses.[66]
{29} None of this bodes well for the rollout of general purpose open stored value systems from the consumer's
perspective. Because the potential market for these generic cash alternatives dwarfs the single specific prepaid
http://jolt.richmond.edu/jolt-archive/v5i2/oconnor.html

6/18

2/22/2018

Volume V, Issue 2, Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

phone card market, the incentive for fraud on unwary consumers will be almost irresistible. Even the nation's
bankers are concerned about the creation of a chaotic alternative currency system that will coexist alongside the
established federal currency system.[67] Thus, by providing a regulatory loophole that allows businesses to
avoid regulation without substantially modifying their plans, the proposed de minimis exemption will be an open
invitation to fraud.

IV. The Proposed De Minimis Exemption To Regulation E
{30} In 1994, Reg E underwent a routine review in accordance with the Federal Reserve Board's Regulatory
Planning and Review program.[68] The final revisions to existing provisions were announced on April 23, 1996.
[69] But this review also sparked debate over how stored value cards should be treated under Reg E. Are their
contents "accounts" as defined by the rule? Is their use an EFT within the congressional intent embodied in
EFTA? Or, within the rule as it exists now? Thus, on April 3, 1996, just before releasing the final rule on the
1994 revisions, the Board issued a Request For Comments on a proposed amendment to Reg E specifically
encompassing stored value cards.[70]
{31} The proposed amendment would add a new section--205.16-- to Reg E specifically for stored value
services.[71] While the new section appears to impose modified Reg E provisions on different types of stored
value cards, the de minimis exemption buried in each covered category eviscerates any practical regulatory
impact. The Federal Reserve Board treats low value (less than $100) stored value cards as a mere subset of the
entire stored value market, but there is ample evidence that such cards will comprise the overwhelming bulk of
the market.[72]

A. The Proposed Amendment's Categorization of Stored Value Systems
{32} The Federal Reserve Board distinguishes three categories of stored value systems. A brief assessment of
the Board's incomplete understanding of stored value mechanics may help shed light on the problematic de
minimis exemption, as well as set the stage for a better solution proposed at the end of this paper. Essentially, a
two variable matrix consisting of an "online/offline" and "accountable/unaccountable" distinction is created. The
first category, "off-line accountable stored value systems," is defined as programs where "the balance of funds
available is recorded on the card, but is also maintained at a central data facility at a bank or elsewhere."[73]
This type of program is probably exemplified by closed university systems where students deposit money in a
school bank account and receive a fixed value card redeemable at retail outlets around campus. The Board
deems these sufficiently similar to standard deposit accounts to fall under Reg E provisions.[74]
{33} The next category, "off-line unaccountable stored-value systems," are systems where "the record of value is
maintained only on the card itself."[75] The Board asserts that "[g]iven the lack of a centrally maintained,
ongoing record of individual card balances or of transaction data in these systems, it is more difficult to conclude
that an 'account' exists for purposes of Regulation E."[76] These two categories are supposed to exhaust offline
stored value programs, yet they omit an important offline variation: smart stored value cards that retain longterm, detailed transaction and account records. As in the example of Visa Cash above,[77] financial institutions
are looking towards microprocessor cards that can retain all of a consumer's financial data. These records will be
as valid and "permanent" as the bank's own records.[78] Thus, a third hybrid card category exists that is
"accountable" in the Board's parlance without the need for an external data facility.
{34} For online systems, only one category is given without any distinction between accountable and
unaccountable. Instead, all online systems are "the functional equivalent of using a debit card to access a
traditional deposit account," and "involve[] on-line access to a database for purposes of transaction authorization
and data capture."[79] This may not be a correct assessment of possible systems, however. Some prepaid phone
cards that store value in a remote account and require an online connection may maintain transaction records
while others may not. Thus some will be "accountable" in the Board's terminology, while other will not be.
http://jolt.richmond.edu/jolt-archive/v5i2/oconnor.html
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{35} Finally, the Board offers a questionable distinction between online stored value systems and debit systems
when it notes that "the value associated with a [stored value] card is limited to the amount that the cardholder
has chosen to make accessible through the card (as opposed to a deposit account accessed by debit card, where
the entire account is accessible and funds available may fluctuate)."[80] In one regard this is true of any EFT
card: Cardholders choose how much value to associate with the card when they decide how much money to
deposit in the accessed account. Further, in virtually all EFT-accessible accounts, the "entire account" is
accessible.[81]

B. The De Minimis Exemption and its Consequences
{36} In the Comments accompanying the proposed amendment, the Board considers the impact of imposing
existing Reg E provisions on each category and expends the bulk of its effort outlining modified Reg E coverage
that appears to extend at least some consumer protections for most categories. Yet, it consistently eviscerates
such protection by either exempting the category from Reg E coverage altogether or by including a $100 de
minimis exemption into categories over which coverage is ostensibly being extended.
{37} More specifically, off-line accountable and on-line stored value systems are subject to a de minimis
exemption of cards capable of storing only up to $100,[82] while off-line unaccountable stored value systems
are purposefully not addressed in the proposed amendment.[83] In the Comments accompanying the proposed
amendment, the Board justifies the de minimis exemption by simply stating that, "[f]or a stored-value product
limited to a relatively small amount of funds, the amount at risk would be sufficiently minimal that application
of even modified Regulation E protections appears unnecessary."[84] Further, the Board appears to buy into the
industry clamor that imposition of Reg E requirements such as transaction receipts will unduly burden the
economic feasibility and development of the stored value card market: "[I]f transaction amounts are on average
quite small (as is likely to be true if the maximum amount on a card is low), the cost impact of Regulation E
compliance would be proportionately greater than for systems involving large transactions."[85]
{38} The Board seems less decisive about not extending any Reg E coverage to off-line unaccountable stored
value systems. So long as off-line unaccountable systems involve only "small dollar amounts and a single use,
such as paying transit fares"[86] the Board sees no problem in denying Reg E coverage, probably under a similar
rationale to that given for the de minimis exemptions in the other system categories. On the other hand, where
offline unaccountable systems involve "substantially larger transaction amounts and maximum card values, and
could have multiple uses," then the Board will view these as "more comparable to traditional debit cards than the
small-value cards."[87] As such, the Board would consider bringing such systems under a modified Reg E
coverage similar to its proposal for off-line accountable systems.
{39} It is interesting that the Board acknowledges the possible overlap between debit systems and large offline
unaccountable systems, while appearing to deny it with regards to off-line accountable and on-line stored value
systems. But more importantly, all of this discussion is a bit of a red herring because even if off-line
unaccountable systems are brought under the "protection" proposed for the other categories, it will still be
subject to the same de minimis exemption.
{40} The impact of the de minimis exemption is what really matters, however. As was already mentioned, the
major financial institutions who are advancing into the stored value market are almost exclusively interested in
the less-than-$20 transaction arena. This is only a fraction of the $100 de minimis exemption cutoff and thus
renders a $100 maximum card feasible. In fact, most subway and telephone cards currently have $20 maximums.
Coupling this with a strong regulatory incentive for $100 maximum cards--i.e. complete absence of Reg E
coverage--means that it is highly likely that card issuers will stick with $100 maximum card systems. In turn this
will result in a strong probability that any given stored value card system will not be covered by Reg E.
{41} The following forgone consumer protections will result:
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Initial disclosures. Even the Federal Reserve Board notes that in the absence of this protection, "consumers
might regard off-line accountable stored-value products as comparable to debit or credit cards, and thus might
expect similar rights and remedies to apply."[88]
{42}Change in terms notice. Despite the Board's view that stored value cards will not have an expected life long
enough to make this protection an issue,[89] many stored value systems utilize durable, reloadable cards that
could last a number of years.[90] Given this fact, it seems ludicrous that stored value card issuers could enact
hidden fees, changes in function, or shifts of liability without notifying the card holder.
{43} Transaction receipts and periodic statements. While the Board asserts that, "for small or commonly-made
transactions, many consumers may not want or need a receipt,"[91] this logic was hardly persuasive when
Congress passed the EFTA in the first place. Neither has it moved the Board to rescind the receipt requirement
from existing Reg E provisions. Likewise, although the Board offers that consumers "may not need or want
documentation on a periodic statement,"[92] this has not exactly been persuasive in the development of Reg E to
date. In fact, receipts are the most important regulatory bulwark against an influx of "black box" transactions
where fraudulent vendors shave pennies off each transaction, or simply siphon off the entire value in one
exchange. And while there may be some short term cards where periodic statements are moot, many issuers are
looking at long term "relationship cards." Most consumers would not be comfortable with a bank account that
did not issue periodic statements so that they could check for errors; neither should they have to accept long term
stored value cards without periodic statements.
{44} Error resolution procedures. The Board acknowledges that "an error within the financial institution's
control, such as one resulting from a malfunctioning card, may not be unduly difficult to correct."[93] Why deny
consumers the important protection afforded by requiring error resolution procedures already in place? Failing to
mandate error resolution procedures is likely to allow card issuers to hold consumers' funds hostage while
proceeding at a snail's pace to resolve a contested transaction.
{45} Two other Reg E protections concerning liability and unsolicited issuance were omitted from the preceding
list because they truly may not be as appropriate in the stored value card environment. First, limitations on
consumer liability for unauthorized transfers will not work in the case of non-authenticating, offline stored value
systems. These cards are just like cash in that anyone can use them without any form of authentication. Placing
the burden of lost or stolen cards on issuers who can do nothing to prevent it is like requiring banks to pay
customers who happen to get robbed while not on the bank's premises. However, for authentication cards, this
blanket exemption is entirely inappropriate.
{46} Second, the restriction on unsolicited issuance of access devices is largely irrelevant for stored value cards
because the consumer will not have been able to place any money on the card yet. Thus, this provision is only
relevant where the issuer could somehow transfer some of the consumer's assets to a card without permission
and then send the unsolicited card to the user. Clearly, the first step would be fraud in and of itself.

V. A Better Compromise
{47} This paper has argued that the rapid emergence of stored value cards and systems has brought with it
enormous potential for fraud, and that the de minimis exemption buried in the proposed Reg E amendment
allows issuers to tap into exactly the market they want with no regulation. By not imposing existing Reg E
protections such as initial disclosure, transaction receipts, and error resolution procedures, the amendment opens
the door for fraudulent issuers to disburse cards that do not really contain the paid-for amount, or that expire
before the consumer has had a chance to use all the value stored. The lack of Reg E protection also enables
unscrupulous vendors to shave off a few extra pennies (or more) on each transaction. Further,if the industry is
allowed to continue in an unregulated fashion, these scams may be only the beginning,. Industry interests have
claimed that regulation will kill this nascent, potentially useful technology before it has a chance to flourish and
work out some of the "bugs." The last section of this paper outlines a Reg E amendment that achieves a better
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balance between the competing values of encouraging the development of new financial tools while protecting
consumer interests.

A. Recategorization of Stored Value Systems
{48} The first step in creating a better Reg E amendment is to eliminate the de minimis exemptions. The second
is to establish a more complete taxonomy of stored value systems. There are five variables to consider:
online/offline, accountable/unaccountable, open/closed system, disposable/reloadable, and
anonymous/authenticated. These definitions need to be modified slightly from the Board's versions.
{49} "Online" encompasses every stored value product that requires an online connection for any reason to
complete a transaction.[94] "Offline" accommodates everything else. "Accountable" systems retain detailed,
protected records of transactions for an indefinite period of time.[95] "Unaccountable" systems comprise the
rest. "Open" systems exist where the card issuer and redeemer are not the same. In "closed" systems, the issuer
and redeemer are the same.[96] "Disposable" cards can be loaded only once, regardless of how much can be
loaded in that first instance. "Reloadable" cards can have value loaded at least once more after the initial value is
installed. Finally, "anonymous" systems lack user authentication during the transaction. "Authenticated" systems
employ identity verification, but distinguish between "pseudonymous" and "actual" identification.
"Pseudonymous" verification uses a PIN or other access code issued at the time of purchase to restrict usage to a
person who has purchased the value on the card.[97] Knowledge of the code is sufficient identification for the
transaction. "Actual" verification is where the card is issued to a particular person--i.e. the card is nontransferable--and identification at the time of transaction must be deemed sufficient to verify the identity of that
particular person.[98]

B. Suggested Modified Reg E Coverage of Stored Value Systems
{50} The foregoing may seem complex, but actually generates only a few important combinations that can be
placed into a hierarchical flow chart. For all stored value systems a few Reg E provisions should always apply.
Knowledge of the code is sufficient identification for the transaction.

1. Provisions Covering All Stored Value Systems
{51} First, initial disclosures of some minimal kind must always be provided. They could be printed on the card,
issued as an accompanying receipt, or prominently displayed at the point of sale. This requires little to no
additional cost to the issuer, yet can have immense importance to consumers unfamiliar with the new systems.
Second, some minimal error resolution procedures must be in place. Existing Reg E error resolution
requirements already take into account the fact that some types of investigation may be hopeless or extremely
burdensome. Stored value service providers are simply asked to take reasonable efforts to resolve consumer
complaints--in some cases there may be simply no way to determine whether a card was defective for example.
But, within the same system, there may be some problems that can reasonably be investigated. Third, displays at
transaction terminals must be available. Without this provision, vendors may be encouraged to use "black box"
terminals that prevent the consumer from monitoring transaction proceedings.[99]
{52} Taken together, these provisions guarantee a uniform baseline of consumer protection without unduly
burdening the developing stored value service industry. Building off this baseline, particular additional
requirements may apply to functional variations of stored value systems.
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2. Provisions Covering Closed Stored Value Systems
{53} Although the Board largely overlooks the open/closed system distinction, it probably has the most impact
on system design and function. As described above, closed systems are easier to implement because the same
entity issues and redeems the card. Third party fraud incentives are eliminated. Further, the consumer has only
one organization to deal with when problems arise. Thus, it may be acceptable to impose fewer restrictions on
closed systems than on open systems. For all closed systems, transaction receipt requirements should be
eliminated. Issuance of receipts in a true closed system may be redundant: It is a little like receiving a
merchandise credit in a department store, and then being issued a receipt for every item you pick up. More
importantly, the major fraud incentive generated in an open system between card issuers and redeemers is
absent, so proof of each and every transaction is less important.[100]
{54} Disposable Stored Value Cards. Closed systems may employ disposable cards, reloadable cards, or both. In
the case of disposable cards, other standard Reg E provisions may be modified. First, periodic statements are
largely irrelevant. Where the disposable card is accountable, card histories[101] should be available upon
demand. For unaccountable cards this is clearly impossible, so no form of periodic statement or card history is
required.[102] Second, regardless of the accountable/unaccountable distinction, disposable card closed systems
should be exempt from change in terms and annual error resolution procedure notices requirements. Consumers
will probably not retain cards long enough for these protections to be relevant. It may be prudent to incorporate a
limited grandfather clause which requires, absent notice, observation of the terms and conditions extant at the
time of card issuance for the life of the card.[103]
{55} Reloadable Stored Value Cards. In the case of reloadable cards, the analysis is different. First, periodic
statements are relevant. For accountable card systems, statements should be available upon demand. For
unaccountable card systems this is, again, probably impossible.[104] Second, all reloadable card closed systems
should make change in terms and annual error resolution procedure notices available upon demand, or posted
conspicuously near system transaction terminals. Alternatively, cards could be electronically date stamped upon
issuance and with each subsequent reload, the date-stamp can be compared with the effective date of any change
in the cards' terms or conditions. If a change has occurred, the terminal either prompts the card holder to request
the updated notices or prints them automatically.
3. Provisions Covering Open Stored Value Systems.
{56} Open systems must instill confidence in both issuers and redeemers that access devices are valid. At the
same time, participating organizations have an incentive to "pass the buck" when consumers run into difficulties,
because it is easy to blame an unrelated organization for the alleged error. Thus, it is unlikely that mag stripe
technology will be able to support an open system. Instead, major open system initiatives such as Visa Cash
have used chip cards--often full microprocessor cards--in anticipation of the rollout of "relationship cards".[105]
Using chip cards requires two things. First, it is easy to configure these cards as accountable. In fact, they may
have to be accountable to instill enough confidence among issuers and redeemers. Second, new terminals need
to be installed to accommodate these cards. The existing debit/credit network terminals are based on mag stripe
technology.
{57} Consequently, transaction receipts should not be unduly burdensome. Small terminals capable of issuing
receipts and accepting everything from credit cards to cash have begun turning up at many gas stations. Thus,
small printers cannot be prohibitively expensive. The standard industry argument that the cost of printing
receipts may overwhelm the value of the transaction is virtually impossible at present. Even the smallest
transaction involving standard US currency ($.01) represents far greater value than the cost of printing a small
receipt with inexpensive ink/toner on thin paper.[106] Further, this argument has never precluded receipts upon
demand for low value cash sales.

{58} Disposable Cards. Similar to closed systems, open systems should be categorized into disposable and
reloadable variations. For disposable cards, the modified provisions are essentially the same.[107] Periodic
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statements, change in terms notices, and annual error resolution procedure notices are all waived. For
accountable cards, possibly the only kind for open systems, card histories should be provided upon demand.
Where they exist, unaccountable cards will have no such requirement.

{59} Reloadable Cards. Reloadable cards should provide change in terms and annual error resolution procedure
notices upon demand. But, in open systems, the alternative of posting notices in conspicuous locations within
system facilities is essentially impossible. Issuers cannot reasonably be expected to post changes in every third
party location where their cards might be accepted. Instead, cards should be electronically date stamped upon
issuance and reload. This date is then compared at subsequent reloads with the effective date of any changes in
the cards' terms and conditions. If a change has occurred, the terminal either prompts the card holder to request
the appropriate notice, or prints the notice out on the spot. Where reloadable cards are accountable, periodic
statements upon demand should be required. Unaccountable cards, if possible, would be exempt from this
condition.

4. Miscellaneous Provisions
{60} Two final distinctions must be addressed. First, the Board distinguishes between its conception of online
and offline systems by correctly noticing that online systems closely resemble traditional deposit accounts. But,
the Board refrains from extending full Reg E coverage to them. Online systems that access remote accounts are
simply disguised asset accounts, however, and should fall under standard Reg E coverage. A regular deposit
account established solely for the purpose of making funds accessible is still deemed an asset account. If it can
be accessed by an EFT access device, it falls under Reg E coverage.
{61} Second, the distinction between anonymous and authenticated systems needs to be clarified. Anonymous
systems allow anyone to access the card and account. Authenticated systems use a PIN or access code to monitor
access in two ways. "Pseudonymous" authentication allows the card and code to be freely transferable. "Actual"
authentication restricts the card and account to a specific user. The implication of this is that Reg E limits on
consumer liability for lost or stolen cards are valid only for online authenticated systems. As the Board observed,
it would be nearly impossible for issuers to notify all potential offline terminals of a lost or stolen card, and
unauthenticated systems do not establish card/account ownership.

VI. Conclusion
{62} The sole purpose of the EFTA and Reg E is to protect consumers in new and unfamiliar electronic financial
applications that have the potential to defraud them of significant amounts of money. The Federal Reserve Board
has failed to fulfill Congressional expectations in this regard by proposing an amendment to Reg E ostensibly
extending consumer protections to stored value cards, but which in fact enables the industry to operate in an
unregulated environment through the inclusion of a $100 de minimis exemption. At least, the problem with this
proposal stems from the value of $100 to different groups of citizens. For some it is indeed a "trifling" matter,
while for most others it is a substantial amount. This paper operates from the premise that consumers should not
be put in the position of accepting the loss of $100 "here and there" at the hands of high-tech con men, just to
encourage an already profitable industry. As such, a workable amendment to Reg E is outlined which does not
include the de minimis exemption. This modified Reg E amendment strikes a better balance between consumer
and industry interests consistent with the legislative intent of the EFTA.
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[18] See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1978).
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[34] See id. § 205.10(d).
[35] See id. § 205.10(e).
[36] See id. § 205.11(a).
[37] See id. § 205.11(b).
[38] See id. § 205.11(c).
[39] See id.
[40] See id.
[41] See id.
[42] See id.
[43] See id. § 205.11(d).

http://jolt.richmond.edu/jolt-archive/v5i2/oconnor.html

14/18

2/22/2018

Volume V, Issue 2, Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
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[45] See The Smart Card Forum (visited October 1, 1998) <http://www.smartcrd.com>; Systems Resources
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[47] Presently costing about $300. The Smart Card Forum (visited October 1, 1998)
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[48] § II(C).
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multi-application cards, logic chip security algorithms may not provide the desired variable protection for
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[50] See TB Family (visited Oct. 7, 1998) < http://www.cp8.bull.net/prod/tbfam.htm>. By comparison, Pentium
chips utilize a 32 bit processor running anywhere from 100 to 200 MHz.
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[52] Id.
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<http://www.cardshow.com/applications/VisaCash/contents.html>.
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Straits Times (Singapore), Dec. 2, 1996, at 44.
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14, 1997) <http://www.cardshow.com/applications/VisaCash/contents.html>.
[58] See id.
[59] See id.
[60] See Steve Rosenbush, More Players Deal Prepaid Phone Cards GTE, Texaco Issue Cards Featuring
Missing Children, USA Today, April 16, 1997, at B1.
[61] Counterfeiting produces unauthorized cards; skimming is fraudulent reloading of value; and buffering
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[62] See Id.
[63] Prepaid Phone Card Prices Plummeting ; Per-Minute Charges Falling As More Firms Offer Service, The
San Francisco Examiner, February 26, 1997, at B-1 (citing International Telecard Association figures).
[64] Because these cards are unregulated, they are not insured by the FDIC (Federal Depositors Insurance
Corporation). Some major issuers such as USA Calling, TLC-The Long Distance Co., and International Global
Net have run into financial problems in the last few months leaving consumers with valueless unused time on
their cards. Id.
[65] Anyone can get cards made cheaply enough and buy time from telephone companies, often on credit, to set
up shop quickly and inexpensively. In the absence of any federal regulation, fly-by-night con-artists have
become problematic enough to spur individual states such as Florida to consider regulating these prepaid phone
card businesses themselves. Id. See also Jim Szymanski, Prepaid Phone Cards Are Tempting Territory For
Fraud, News Tribune, February 02, 1997, at G1.
[66] Federal agents reported that the Gambino family defrauded consumers and telephone companies out of $50
million in New York and New Jersey alone by selling $20 cards that became worthless after only $2-3 had been
used. Selwyn Raab, Officials Say Mob Is Shifting Crimes To New Industries, The New York Times, February 10,
1997, at A1.
[67] Of course, this may be mainly a case of protecting self-interest for the bankers, nonetheless the concerns are
real for consumers as well. See Joseph Radigan, Locking Up The Money Monopoly, U.S. Banker, Jan. 1997 at
26.
[68] See supra at note 5.
[69] Id.
[70] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Proposed Rule: Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation
E; Docket No. R-0919) (April 3, 1996).
[71] Id. at 20-22.
[72] See See Experts Ask: What is the Value of Stored Value?, Bank Network News, February 11, 1997; Colin
Baptie and Nicola Adamson, VISA Cash: The Next Frontier in Payment Processing (visited Oct. 14, 1997)
<http://www.cardshow.com/applications/VisaCash/contents.html>.
[73] Board of Governors, supra, note 44 at 8. The Board does not mention that a single card must be the only
means of access to the account, else a withdrawal or other deduction in the central account could occur while the
presented card still indicates value in the account. This is given as a condition of online stored value systems,
however.
[74] Board of Governors, at 8.
[75] See id.
[76] See id.
[77] Colin Baptie and Nicola Adamson, VISA Cash: The Next Frontier in Payment Processing (visited Oct. 14,
1997) <http://www.cardshow.com/applications/VisaCash/contents.html>.
[78] This is part of a larger trend towards "distributed" computing and record-keeping. Rather than overwhelm a
central facility with data and computing tasks, local systems such as PCs or branch office file servers can
perform many of these functions. Smart cards are an integral part of this development.
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[79] Id. at 9.
[80] See id.
[81] One exception is when the account is structured in such a way as to preclude one owner from withdrawing
all or some of the assets; then, the EFT card cannot access the entire account.
[82] Board of Governors at 20-21 (The de minimis exemption will be incorporated into the CFR as § 205.16(c)).
[83] Id. at 14 ("Under the proposed amendments, off-line unaccountable stored-value systems would not be
covered by Regulation E. The proposed amendments do not provide an explicit exemption; instead, the
definitions of systems that would be covered under the proposal do not capture off-line unaccountale systems.").
[84] Id. at 13.
[85] Id. at 17.
[86] Id. at 14.
[87] See id.
[88] Board of Governors, at 10.
[89] Id., at 11.
[90] In fact, there is every reason to expect them to last as long as other bank cards currently do. The next
generation of "smart" chip cards should last even longer as their contents are protected from the elements.
[91] Board of Governors, at 12.
[92] Id., at 12.
[93] See id.
[94] The online connection may be simply for some form of user authentication: Not necessarily that the user is
"John Jones," but that the user has the correct PIN and is the same person who purchased the card.
[95] A record that is kept only for the day or even week does not qualify.
[96] In the university examples, a card redeemable only at university-owned facilities is part of a closed system,
while cards redeemable at non-university-owned facilities are part of an open system. Whether facilities are
physically on or off campus is irrelevant for this distinction.
[97] This does not have to be the "original" purchaser--i.e. the person who bought the card from the issuer.
Instead, this system allows transfer of the card and the code to any third party whom the original purchaser
chooses.
[98] This could still be a PIN, but is increasingly likely to be a PIN plus photo ID/signature. Of course, a major
facilitator of the coming stored value card/e-cash/digital commerce revolution is the digital biometric identifier
which promises near-instantaneous verification of identification by testing a finger, hand, eye, or face placed
near a small reader. With smart cards, the authentication can be done on the card, in conjunction with an on-site
reader.
[99] This does not prevent fraud--an unscrupulous vendor could still misrepresent the transaction amount, but it
both allows consumers to catch legitimate errors in the transaction and helps maintain honesty. Consumers will
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soon be able to purchase "electronic purses" that allow access to the contents of some stored value cards, but this
should not preclude protection for those that cannot, or who simply choose not to.
[100] We might consider requiring receipts for purchases of the initial card, or subsequent reloading.
[101] Documenting whatever information was recorded during each transaction.
[102] This may encourage system designers to utilize only unaccountable systems. However, other
considerations regarding general system accounting can have a counterbalancing effect here.
[103] This could be accomplished by recording a simple date stamp in the card's data storage area. This could be
done with little difficulty by mag stripe. Further, a fixed time limit, say one year, would override the grandfather
clause.
[104] By definition, where the card, a mandatory online database link, or vendors compile data sufficient to
identify the transactions later, the system has changed from unaccountable to accountable.
[105] Colin Baptie and Nicola Adamson, VISA Cash: The Next Frontier in Payment Processing (visited Oct. 14,
1997) <http://www.cardshow.com/applications/VisaCash/contents.html>.
[106] Proposed systems based on micropayments, transactions of a fraction of a cent, could validate the industry
argument. However, if and when such systems become available, the Board will have to reconsider its position
on Reg E and other financial regulations anyway.
[107] The only variation comes from the different overarching requirements for open versus closed systems.
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